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Abstract 
We present a dynamic two-region model with overlapping generations. 
There are two types of productive public expenditure, education and 
infrastructure funding, and governments decide optimally on budget size 
(tax rate) and its allocation across the two outlays. Productivity of 
government infrastructure spending can differ across regions. This 
assumption follows well established empirical evidence, and highlights 
regional heterogeneity in a previously unexplored dimension. We study 
the implications of three different fiscal regimes for capital accumulation 
and aggregate national welfare. Full centralization of revenue and 
expenditure decisions is the optimal fiscal arrangement for the country 
when infrastructure spending productivity is similar across regions. When 
regional differences exist but are not too large, the partial centralization 
regime is optimal where the federal government sets a common tax rate, 
but allows the regional governments to decide on the budget composition. 
Only when the differences are sufficiently large does full decentralization 
become the optimal regime. National steady state output is instead highest 
when the economy is decentralized. This result is consistent with the 
“Oates conjecture” that fiscal decentralization increases capital 
accumulation. However, in terms of welfare this result can be reversed. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The question of the optimal level of decentralization of government activities has 
received considerable attention in the last decades. Starting with Tiebout (1956) a large 
body of literature has analyzed a variety of reasons that determine whether a particular 
government activity ought to be carried out by the national government or by sub units of 
the national government.1 What has, in contrast, received relatively little attention is the 
“Oates conjecture”. Oates (1993) conjectured that the degree of decentralization and 
economic growth should be positively correlated, since decentralization ought to allow 
better tailoring of public policies to suit local economic conditions. Empirical evidence 
on this relationship is mixed, however. While some authors find a negative relation  
(e.g., Davoodi and Zou 1998, Zhang and Zou 1998), others find a positive or no 
systematic one (e.g., Iimi 2005). There is also surprisingly little theoretical work on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth. The recent paper by Brueckner 
(2006) who argues that decentralization fosters growth by increasing the incentives to 
save and to invest in human capital, is a notable exception. This study is complementary 
to his since it emphasizes a different channel that is important for the decentralization-
growth nexus. A starting point of our analysis is the assumption that the stock of 
infrastructure is an essential input in the production of final goods and that the 
productivity of infrastructure varies considerably across different regions. This 
assumption is well supported by data2, and it highlights an interesting dimension of 
regional heterogeneity that has previously not received sufficient attention in the 
theoretical literature.  
 
We study the implications of fiscal (de)centralization for capital accumulation and 
aggregate national welfare in a simple dynamic model of a small federal economy with 
two heterogeneous regions. The (local or federal) government decides optimally on the 
size of the public budget by setting a tax rate, and on the composition of public spending 
across two types of productive expenditure, education and infrastructure funding. 
Revenue and expenditure decisions are not necessarily carried out by the same layer of 
government. More specifically, we study three different fiscal regimes: 1) Full 
decentralization in which each region chooses all its policy parameters – the tax rate and 
budget shares allocated to education and respectively infrastructure – independently in 
                                                 
1 For example, Oates (1972), Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997) stress the role of 
scale economies in the provision of public services. According to Oates (1972) and Besley and Coate 
(2003), externalities that extend beyond jurisdiction boundaries may make centralization an optimal 
arrangement. Tax competition with a mobile tax base may constitute one drawback of a decentralized 
structure (see, for example, Brueckner (2004)). Seabright (1996) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) study 
how political accountability and rent seeking influence political (de)centralization. Diaz-Cayeros (2005) 
studies how differences in the cost of delivery of public services and income differences across regions 
influence the optimal degree of decentralization. Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) allow for fixed costs and 
spatial decay in the delivery of public services. They find that demographic shifts favor decentralization. 
2 Charlot and Schmitt (1999) estimate the regional output elasticities of public capital for the regions of 
France and find that they differ by more than a factor of 4. Cohen and Morrison (2001) estimate how 
average manufacturing costs respond to public investment and find elasticities that vary by more than a 
factor of 4 across the US regions. For Spain, Moreno, Lopez-Bazo and Artis (2002) find the analogous 
elasticity to vary by more than a factor of 2. Romp and de Haan (2005) provide a comprehensive review on 
estimates for public capital elasticity, including studies at the regional level. 
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order to maximize regional welfare; 2) Complete centralization where the federal 
government sets the same policy parameters in both regions such as to maximize national 
welfare; 3) A mixed regime where the federal government sets a common tax rate, but 
allows the regional governments to decide on the public budget composition. The latter 
regime of “partial centralization” captures the situation in many federal states fairly well.  
In Germany, for example, the governments of the single Länder have no discretion over 
tax rates, but they can decide on the structure of their regional budgets. 
 
In the model we assume that the each region is completely specialized in the production 
of one particular good. All consumers are identical and value the two different goods 
from the two regions symmetrically. They live in an overlapping generations fashion for 
two periods and then die. The specification of individual preferences is similar to Glomm 
and Ravikumar (1992): All individuals derive utility from leisure when young, 
consumption goods when old, and from the quality of the child’s education. In order to 
finance the expenditures on the two types of public goods, a tax on labor income is 
raised. In the first period agents choose to allocate time to learning or to leisure. Learning 
time together with parental human capital and publicly provided education generates the 
child’s human capital. In the second period of life human capital is supplied inelastically 
to the labor market. Infrastructure, which is available as a local public good, augments 
the productivity of labor. The interaction between the two outlays of the public budget is 
incorporated naturally in our model, by recognizing the inherently dynamic nature of 
human capital formation in contrast to the contemporaneous effect of infrastructure.  
 
Regions are assumed to differ in the productivity of infrastructure.  Consequently, the 
degree of heterogeneity of the regional infrastructure spending productivities is key in 
determining which fiscal regime (centralized, de-centralized or mixed) maximizes 
aggregate national welfare in the steady state. We show that full fiscal centralization is 
the optimal regime when infrastructure spending productivity is similar across regions. 
When regional differences are not too large, partial centralization is the optimal 
arrangement. Only when infrastructure productivity differences are sufficiently large does 
full decentralization become optimal.  
 
The intuition for these results is that centralization has one advantage and one 
disadvantage compared to decentralization in this model. When making the optimal 
revenue and expenditure decision, regional governments fully try to manipulate the 
relative price of the two consumption goods, i.e., they try to use the policy instruments 
strategically in order to shift the terms of trade in their respective favour. If all decisions 
were made at the central level, the federal government, which maximizes a weighted sum 
of utilities of residents in both regions,  takes into account the relative population sizes of 
the two regions when it calculates the effects of its policies on the relative price. It 
internalizes the fiscal externality that is at work under decentralization. Only when the 
two regions are of equal size, there is no relative price effect in the centralized solution.   
The disadvantage of centralization on the other hand is that the federal government 
imposes an identical policy (“one size fits all”) on both regions, although regions may be 
heterogeneous in terms of their infrastructure spending productivity. If regions are 
similar, however, this cost is low and hence centralization is preferable over 
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decentralization. In the regime of partial centralization one policy tool is taken away from 
regional governments (the tax rate), but they maintain one instrument that they can use 
strategically (the budget composition). This fiscal regime compromises on the pros and 
cons of (de)centralization. The fiscal externality is “partly” internalized, but regions may 
still differentiate policies to account for their heterogeneity. Yet, we also find some 
important asymmetries in the welfare gains (losses) that arise from partial centralization. 
In particular, there are cases where national welfare rises if both policy tools are 
centralized, but not if there is only a centralization of the decision about the tax rate. 
Underlying all these results is the fact that the optimal size, and the optimal budget 
composition depends on the degree of (de)centralization. In particular, we find that when 
two regions have similar infrastructure productivities, centralization implies a lower 
budget size but a higher optimal fraction that goes to infrastructure investment.  
 
The second central result of this paper concerns the comparison of the three different 
fiscal regimes with respect to aggregate national output. We provide in fact a 
confirmation of the “Oates conjecture” by establishing that steady state aggregate income 
is highest when the economy is most decentralized and second highest under partial 
centralization. Recall, however, that the ordering of the three centralization regimes in 
terms of welfare may be reversed. That is, decentralization maximizes capital 
accumulation and hence long-run levels of output, but it need not be the optimal fiscal 
arrangement. 
 
Our paper is related to a large literature on the effects of public infrastructure funding on 
capital accumulation and growth. Examples of work in this literature include Barro 
(1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) and Cassou and 
Lansing (1998). There is a similarly large literature on the effects of public education 
funding on capital accumulation and growth including papers by Loury (1981), Glomm 
and Ravikumar (1992), Benabou (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), Blankenau and 
Simpson (2004). In these models the focus is typically on one type of government 
expenditure and its effects on capital accumulation are relatively well understood. There 
is also a smaller but growing literature that studies growth models where the government 
runs several programs, e.g. Devajaran et al (1996), Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), Baier 
and Glomm (2001), Arcalean et al. (2006). Most of the above models take government 
policy as exogenous and ask: What are the effect on capital accumulation and growth of 
exogenous changes in policy? All of these models study the effects of policy reform in a 
single region economy. What is less well understood is how government policy 
influences economic outcomes when the economy has a federal structure where either the 
national or sub-national government chooses optimally between two types of productive 
public expenditure.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, which is solved in 
section 3. Section 4 analyzes the optimal policies under different fiscal regimes while 
section 5 presents a welfare comparison of these regimes. Section 6 concludes. 
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II. The Model 
 
We consider an economy that consists of two regions. Each region produces one distinct 
consumption good and both of these goods are traded at no cost across the regions. Each 
region is populated by two-period lived overlapping generations. Each period a new 
cohort of young agents is born, so that total population in each region remains constant. 
We abstract completely from labor migration for three reasons. Firstly, a large previous 
literature (starting with Tiebout, 1956) has already analyzed (de)centralization when 
individuals are mobile and have heterogeneous preferences over the provision of public 
goods. Here we focus on trade as a different channel of interaction between regions. 
Second, together with the assumption of equal total factor productivity, regional wage 
differences are small, so that abstracting from migration may not be too restrictive an 
assumption. Third, at least in the context of many European countries, internal migration 
is small.  
 
Regional population sizes may differ. We denote with 0iρ >  the size of a generation in 
region i=1,2. All individuals in the economy are identical in preferences. The utility 
function of an individual born at time t in region i=1,2 is given by  
 
 ( ), , 1 , 1 , 1ln ln ln lni t i t i t i t in c d E ρ+ + ++ + +  (1)  
 
where 1, +tic  and 1, +tid  are the goods produced in region 1 and in regions 2, respectively, 
consumed by a household in period (t+1) in region i. Here tin , denotes leisure. The term ( )1i t iE ρ+,  can be interpreted as schooling expenditure per student and hence the quality 
of public schooling at time (t + 1), which we assume is given by the aggregate spending 
on public education ( 1,i tE + ) weighted by regional population size ( iρ ). This specification 
of preferences with the warm glow altruism is an extension of those used by Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1992). Each child in each of the two regions has access to a technology to 
produce human capital. This technology is given by  
 
 ( ) ( )1 1i t i t i t i i th n E hη γ δθ ρ+ = −, , , ,  (2) 
 
where ( ,1 i tn− ) is time allocated by the child to schooling, tih ,  is parental human capital 
and 1, +tih  is the human capital acquired by the child. The parameter θ  represents a 
productivity shifter of human capital accumulation, η  and δ  measure the elasticity of 
own time spend in education and parental human capital, respectively, and γ  represents 
the productivity of government spending in the education sector. We assume that 
0,,, >δγηθ and 1γ δ+ ≤ . Notice that with logarithmic preferences and with the Cobb-
Douglas specification of the learning technology, our specification of preferences is 
equivalent to a specification in which human capital of the off-spring enters the utility 
function.   
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In each region output ,i tY  is produced with a technology that employs human capital. The 
corresponding production function is given by: 
 
 , , , , ,i t i t i t i t i i tY A H A hρ= =  (3) 
where ,i tH  is the aggregate, and ,i th  is the per capita level of human capital in region i. 
Productivity tiA ,  is a function of the per capita stock of infrastructure capital tiG ,  
available at the time. We assume the following functional form where public 
infrastructure is essential for production but exhibits decreasing returns3 
 
 ( ), ,i t i i t i iA A G ρ Ψ= ⋅  (4) 
 
The parameter 1iA >  is an exogenous and region-specific overall productivity level, and 
0 1iψ< <  represents the productivity of public infrastructure spending in region i. Note 
that iA  and iψ  are allowed to differ, whereas the other productivity parameters , ,θ η δ  
and γ  are assumed to be identical across regions. We also assume that the stock of 
infrastructure fully depreciates between periods.  
 
The government finances both types of public expenditure, education spending and 
infrastructure investment by raising income taxes. We consider three cases. In the first 
case, each region has its own government, that is fiscal policy is completely 
decentralized. Let ,i tτ denote the tax rate at time t. Then the government budget constraint 
in region i is  
 , , , , , , , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i i tE G w H w hτ τ ρ+ = = , 
 
where ,i tw  is the wage per efficiency unit of labor. The government is not allowed to 
borrow. We will be studying the implication of allocating government revenue between 
infrastructure investment and public education. Letting ,0 1i tλ< <  denote the share of the 
government budget allocated to infrastructure we get 
 
 , , , , , , , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tG w H Yλ τ λ τ= =  (5) 
 , , , , , , , ,(1 ) (1 )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tE w H Yλ τ λ τ= − = − . (6) 
 
Section IV studies the cases of partial and complete centralization. In the partially 
centralized regime, the central government sets a common tax rate in both regions and 
allows the local governments to decide on the expenditure composition. In the fully 
centralized regime, both dimensions of the fiscal policy are decided at the central level.  
                                                 
3 Adjusting the productivity of the public capital by population size allows us to focus on regional 
interaction in the absence of scale effects in production 
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III. Solving the Model for the Competitive Equilibrium  
 
An agent in region 1 solves the following problem: 
 
{ } ( )1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1, , ln ln lnlnt t t t t t tt tn c d c d EU nMax ρ+ + + + ++ + + +=  (7) 
 
subject to ( ) ( )1, 1 1, 1, 1 1,1t t t th n E hη γ δθ ρ+ = −  (8) 
 ( )1, 1 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 11t t t t t tc p d w hτ+ + + + + ++ = −  (9) 
        given 1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1 1,, , , , ,t t t t t tE E w p hτ+ + + +  
 
where 1tp +  is the relative price of the tradable good produced in region 2.  Households in 
region 2 solve a similar problem. A competitive equilibrium for this economy can be 
defined as follows: 
 
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium in a two-region economy (i=1,2) is a set of 
sequences of allocations i,t i,t i,t t=0{c ,d ,h }
∞ , prices t i,t t=0{p ,w }
∞ , such that, in each region, for a 
given set of government policies i,t i,t t=0{ , }τ λ ∞ : 
    1) Given the prices, the allocations i,t i,t i,t t=0{c ,d ,h }
∞  solve the household problem; 
    2) Given the prices, the allocations i,t t=0{h }
∞ solve the firm's problem; 
    3) Final good markets clear: 1 1,t 2 2,t 2,t 2,t+ =(1 ) Yd dρ ρ τ− 4; 
    4) Government budget is balanced. 
 
 
The optimal amount of time allocated to schooling is constant and given by 
 
 ( )( )1, 2,1 1 2 1 2t tn n η η− = − = + . (10) 
 
Solving the maximization problem above yields the following individual demand 
functions for the two goods in each region: 
 ( )1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 11 12t t t tc w hτ+ + + += −  (11) 
 ( )1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1
1
1 1
2t t t tt
d w h
p
τ+ + + +
+
= −  (12) 
                                                 
4 This is the market clearing condition for good produced in region 2. The total output in region 2 equals 
demand of residents in region 1 1 1,t( )dρ , demand of residents in region 2 2 2,t( )dρ  and the government 
consumption in region 2, which equals the total tax receipts 2,t 2,t( Y )τ . 
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 ( )12, 1 2, 1 2, 1 2, 112tt t t tpc w hτ++ + + += −  (13) 
 ( )2, 1 2, 1 2, 1 2, 11 12t t t td w hτ+ + + += −  (14) 
 
With perfect competition, the wage rate per unit of human capital is given by , ,i t i tw A= , 
and from (3) - (6) it follows that 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , , ,1 11 1ii ii t i t i t i i t i i i t i t i i tG A H A hψψ ψλ τ ρ ρ λ τ− − −= = ⋅  (15) 
 ( ) ( ), , , , 1i t i i t i t i t i i i iw A H A ψ ψλ τ ρ −=  (16) 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ), , , , , , , 11i t i t i t i i t i t i t i i t i i iE A H A H ψ ψλ τ λ τ ρ −= −  (17) 
 
Using (6), (10) and (16) in (8) we obtain the following law of motion for human capital in 
region i:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 , , , , ,1 111i t i i t i t i i t i t i ti i i ih B A A h
γψ
ψ
ψδ γ ψλ τ λ τ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠+ −
+ −+⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= − ⋅⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (18) 
 
where ( )2 (1 2 )B ηθ η η≡ + . Let us assume that ( )( )1 1 iγ δ ψ< − − .  This assumption 
imposes decreasing returns to scale in the augmentable factors and ensures that the 
economy will converge to a steady state in levels. If we had alternatively imposed 
constant returns to scale in the augmentable factors the model would permit a balanced 
growth equilibrium instead. In this case we would obtain analogous results. With time- 
constant policy parameters iτ , iλ  we obtain a unique steady state for human capital: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
1, 1
i
ii
ii i i i i i i i ih B A A
ψ
γ δ ψ δψ
ψ
γ
τ λ λ τ λ τ
−
− − − −
−
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (19) 
 
Next, we use the market clearing for good 2, 1 1,t 2 2,t 2,t 2,t+ =(1 ) Yd dρ ρ τ− , to get the relative 
price. Plugging in the expression for individual demands 1,td  and 2,td , in the market 
clearing condition for good produced in region 2, we obtain :  
 
( ) ( )1 1, 1, 1, 2 2, 2, 2, 2,t 2,t1 11 + 1 =(1 )Y2 2t t t t t tt w h w hpρ τ ρ τ τ⋅ − ⋅ − −  (20) 
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Solving for the relative price yields: 
  
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1 1,1, 1, 1 1, 1
22, 2, 2 2,
2, 2 2, 2, 2, 2 2,
1 1
2 2
1
1
11
1 1
t t t t tt t t
t
t t t
t t t t t
A h A hw h
p
w h A h A h
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
τ λ ττ ρ ρ
ρτ ρ τ λ τ
−
−
−−= = ⋅− −
 (21) 
 
 
IV. Optimal policies under different fiscal regimes 
 
In this section we solve for the optimal fiscal policies in each regime. For notational 
convenience we normalize the size of region 1 to one ( 1 1ρ = ) from now on, and let 
2ρ ρ=  measure the (relative) size of region 2.  
 
IV.1. Complete decentralization  
 
We start with the decentralized case where each region decides independently on the size 
and the composition of its respective public budget. This regime can perhaps be thought 
of as corresponding to the case of the United States, where the single states have 
considerable fiscal autonomy with respect to both revenue and expenditure decisions, at 
least compared to most of their European counterparts. The local governments choose 
their respective taxes and public budget allocation each period to maximize the indirect 
utility function of a representative individual of the currently adult generation.5  
 
Since 1 1ρ = , the optimization problem of the government region 1 is the following: 
 
{ } ( )1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1,1, 1 1, 1 , 1 ln ln lnln t t t tt t t t c d EU nMaxτ λ + + ++ + + + + +=  
 
Abstracting from constants and using (10), (11) and (12) the optimization problem in 
region 1 can be formulated as follows:  
 
 { } ( )( ) ( )1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1,1, 1 1, 1 2 ln 1 ln lnt t t t tt t w h E pMaxτ λ τ + + + + ++ + − + −  (22) 
 
subject to (16), (17), (21), and given 1, 1tH + .  
 
                                                 
5 In this problem we assume that the government choosing the policy parameters lives only as long as 
agents that voted for it. In other words, the government is “myopic” in the sense it does not take into 
account the effects of the policies chosen on future generations in its optimization problem. We also solved 
the infinitely-lived social planner’s problem of maximizing time-discounted utility stream of all future 
generations. All results regarding the welfare maximizing fiscal regime are qualitatively the same as the 
myopic government’s problem but are analytically less tractable. Derivations are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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The corresponding problem in region 2 is: 
 
 { } ( )( ) ( )2, 1 2, 1 2, 1 2, 1 1,2, 1 2, 1 2 ln 1 ln lnt t t t tt t w h E pMaxτ λ τ ρ ρ+ + + + ++ + − + +  (23) 
 
subject to (16), (17) and (21), where 2, 1 2, 1t tH hρ+ +=  is given. Taking first order 
conditions, we obtain:  
 
, 1 , 1
11 0
1 (1 )
i
i t i t i
ψ
τ τ ψ+ +
+− + =− −  (24) 
 
 
, 1 , 1
21 0
1 (1 )
i
i t i t i
ψ
λ λ ψ+ +− + =− −  (25) 
 
Solving the equations above yields: 
 , , 1 ,
* 1 (0,1)
2
i
i t i t D i
ψτ τ τ+ += = = ∈  (26) 
 , , 1 ,
* 2 (0,1)
1
i
i t i t D i
i
ψλ λ λ ψ+= = = ∈+  (27) 
 
Equations (26) and (27) state that both the size of the public budget in region i, and the 
budget share devoted to infrastructure increase with the regional productivity of public 
infrastructure spending iψ . This optimal policy choice under decentralization neither 
depends on regional sizes, nor on any education-related variable. The reasons are that 
agents take school quality at time t ( 1,tE ) as given and that utility takes the logarithmic 
form. Note further that the government in either region has an incentive to use policy 
instruments strategically in order to shift the terms of trade, 1tp + , in their favour while 
taking the policy parameters of the other region as given (see (21)). This jurisdictional 
competition generates a fiscal externality under decentralization that we will describe in 
further detail below. The optimal policy choice in region 1 still does not directly depend 
on infrastructure spending productivity in region 2 (or vice versa). This is also due to the 
logarithmic preferences. 
 
Substituting (26) and (27) back into (19) yields the steady state level of human capital in 
region i under decentralization with all policy parameters chosen optimally:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ),
1
1 1
1, ,
* ** 1, 2
i
i
i D i i i i
i
ii D i D A Ah B
γ
ψγ γ δ ψ δψ
ψψ ψτ λ −
−
− − − −
−−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= ⋅⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (28) 
 
Upon substitution one obtains the respective values for wages, output, schooling quality, 
infrastructure, and utility of the representative consumer in region i, ,
*
i DU . Postulating a 
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utilitarian social welfare function, we finally obtain a measure of total national welfare 
under a decentralized fiscal regime as a function of exogenous parameters only, namely 
 
 ( ) 1, 2,, ,* ** * *,D D Di D i D U Uτ λ ρΩ = + ⋅   
 
Details about the derivation can be found in appendix A. 
 
 
IV.2. The fully centralized case  
 
In the centralized case, distinguished by the subscript “C”, a federal government 
optimally sets τ  and λ  so as to maximize the weighted utility of agents living in both 
regions. France may be considered an example of such an economy, where most fiscal 
decisions on both the revenue and the expenditure side are made by the central 
government. Therefore, neither the tax rate nor the expenditure share devoted to 
infrastructure is allowed to differ across regions. The objective of the government is: 
 
{ } ( ) ( )1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 2, 2, 1 2, 1 2, 11 1, ln ln ln ln ln ln ln /lnt t t t t t t tt t C c d E c d En nMaxτ λ ρρ+ + + + + ++ + ⎡ ⎤= + + + + + + +⎣ ⎦Ω
 
This can be rewritten (again abstracting from constants) as follows: 
 
{ } ( ) ( )( )1 1 2 11 1 t tt t C ln E ln EMaxτ λ ρ ρ+ ++ + = + ⋅Ω , ,,    (29) 
   ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 12 1 1 1t t t t t t tln w h ln w h ln pτ ρ τ ρ+ + + + + + +⎡ ⎤+ − + ⋅ − − −⎣ ⎦, , , ,  
 
subject to  1, 1 1, 1,
2
1 2t t t
h E h
η
γ δηθ η+
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ ,      ( )2, 1 2, 2,
2
1 2t t t
h E h
η
γ δηθ ρη+
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠     
  ( ) ( )1, 1 1 1 1 1, 1 1 1 11t t t tw A H A ψ ψλ τ+ + + + −= ,   ( ) ( )2, 1 2 1 1 2, 1 2 2 21t t t tw A H A ψ ψλ τ ρ+ + + + −=  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2
1 21 1, 1 1 1
1 1 1
2 2, 1
1 1
2 2
1
1 1
1
1 ( )tt t t
t
A h
p
A h
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ λ τρ
−+ − −
+ + +
+
−
+ −
+
= ⋅ ,
 , 1 1 1 , 1 , 1(1 )i t t t i t i tE w Hλ τ+ + + + += − ,  
and given 1, 1tH +  and 2, 1tH + . Taking the first order conditions, we obtain: 
 
 ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 2 2 1 21 1 1 2 1
2 1 1 2 1 2
1 1 1t t t
C ρ ψ ψ ψ ρ ψ ψ ψ
τ τ ψ ψ τ+ + +
+ + − + + −∂Ω = − +∂ − − −   (30) 
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( ) ( )( )
( )( )
2 1 2
1 1 1 2 1
1 2 2 3 11
1 1 1t t t
C ψ ρ ψ ρ ψ ρρ
λ λ ψ ψ λ+ + +
+ + + − +∂Ω += − +∂ − − −   (31) 
 
The first order condition with respect to the tax rate, equation (30), does not depend on 
1tλ + , just like the first order condition with respect to the budget share, equation (31) does 
not depend on 1tτ + . This illustrates the separability of revenue and expenditure decisions 
by a government in this model. Solving out these conditions we obtain the following 
utility maximizing tax rate and budget share for the fully centralized case, which depend 
on the regional infrastructure spending productivities weighted by the regional size ρ  
 
( ) ( )( )
( )
1 2 2 1
1 2 1 2
* 1 1 2 1 1 2 (0,1)
3 2 3 2C
ψ ψ ρ ψ ψτ ψ ψ ρ ψ ψ
+ − + + −= ∈− − + − −  (32) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 21 2 1 2
* 2 1 2 3 1 (0,1)
1 2 1C
ψ ρ ψ ρ ρ ψ ψλ ρ ψ ρψ ρ ψ ψ
+ + + − += ∈+ + + − +  (33) 
 
When policies are set according to (32) and (33) in both regions the optimal level of 
human capital in steady state in region i=1,2 follows directly from (19), and all other 
endogenous variables can be computed accordingly. We can then derive total national 
welfare under centralization, ( ) 1, 2,* ** * *,C C CC C U Uτ λ ρΩ = + ⋅ . The derivation of this expression 
is also deferred to appendix A. Comparing the optimal tax rate and the optimal 
infrastructure budget share under centralization and decentralization, we can establish 
two important intermediate results: 
 
 
Proposition 1 
Assume without loss of generality that 12 ψψ < , i.e. infrastructure spending is more 
productive in region 1. Then there exists a threshold ( ) ( )21 ( 2) 3 2ψ ρ ψ ρ ρ= + + + +  
(0,1)∈  such that 2 1C D Dτ τ τ< <, ,* * *  if  1ψ ψ<   and 2 1D C Dτ τ τ< <, ,* * *  otherwise. 
 
Proof 
First, from (26) we get 2 1D Dτ τ<, ,* *  when 2 1ψ ψ< . Moreover, this assumption guarantees 
that 1C Dτ τ< ,* * . To see this, solve 1C Dτ τ< ,* *  for 1ψ . This yields 
( ) ( )1 21 (2 3 ) 1 2ψ χ ρ ψ ρ ρ> = − − + + +  and 2χ ψ> . Thus 1 2ψ ψ>  is a sufficient 
condition for 1C Dτ τ< ,* * . On the other side, when ( ) ( )1 21 ( 2) 3 2ψ ψ ρ ψ ρ ρ> = + + + +  it 
follows that 2D Cτ τ<,* *  Thus, 1ψ ψ>  is a sufficient condition for 2 1D C Dτ τ τ< <, ,* * * . 
Alternatively, 2 1C D Dτ τ τ< <, ,* * *  if 1ψ ψ< .   
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That is, the move towards centralization may lead to a tax rate that is “in between” the 
two regional tax rates under decentralization. A sufficient condition for this case is that 
1ψ  is larger than the threshold ψ  that is given above, which is more likely to be true 
when the difference in regional spending productivities is large. Yet, it is also possible 
that the centralization leads to a lower tax rate in both regions, irrespective of regional 
sizes. A sufficient condition for this case is that 1ψ ψ< , which is more likely to be true 
when the difference in regional infrastructure spending productivities is relatively small. 
Centralization can never lead to a higher tax rate in both regions. Similarly, we can state 
the following result: 
 
 
Proposition 2 
Assume without loss of generality that 12 ψψ < . Then there exists a threshold 
( ) ( )2 21 2 1 0 1ψ ψ ρ ρ ψ ρ= + + + ∈( ) ( ) ( , )%  such that 2 1D D Cλ λ λ< <, ,* * *  if 1ψ ψ< %  and  
2 1D C Dλ λ λ< <, ,* * * otherwise. 
 
Proof 
First, from (27) we get  2 1D Dλ λ<, ,* *  when 12 ψψ < . The inequality 2D Cλ λ<,* *  is equivalent 
to ( )1 2 2 1 2ψ κ ψ ψ ρ ρ> = + − −( ) . It can be easily shown then that 2κ ψ> , so the 
assumption 1 2ψ ψ>  is sufficient to guarantee 2D Cλ λ<,* * . On the other side, 1D Cλ λ<,* *  
whenever ( ) ( )1 2 21 2 1ψ ψ ψ ρ ρ ψ ρ< = + + +( ) ( )% . Thus, a sufficient condition for 
2 1D D Cλ λ λ< <, ,* * *  is 1ψ ψ< % . Alternatively, 2 1D C Dλ λ λ< <, ,* * *  if 1ψ ψ> % .  
 
 
In other words, the move from de-centralization to centralization will always increase the 
budget share devoted to infrastructure in the “low-ψ ” region that used to spend relatively 
little on infrastructure under decentralization. In the “high-ψ ” region the infrastructure 
share may increase or decrease. A sufficient condition that the budget share under 
centralization is higher than under decentralization in both regions is that 1ψ  is below the 
threshold ψ%  given above, i.e. that the difference in regional infrastructure spending 
productivities is not too large. In case of a large difference between 1ψ  and 2ψ  it is 
possible that the budget share under centralization ranges “in between” the two regional 
ones under decentralization. More generally, our model offers one theoretical explanation 
for the empirical observation by Arze del Granado et al. (2005) that decentralization 
affects the functional composition of public budgets. These theoretical predictions 
regarding the optimal public budget composition complement earlier work by Keen and 
Marchand (1997) and Matsumoto (2004) who study whether fiscal competition generates 
an optimal mix of public inputs. Their results however focus on publicly provided goods 
whose benefits vary according to the mobility of factors of production, while in our 
model both publicly provided goods enhance the productivity of immobile labor.    
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An instructive special case is the one with equally large regions where infrastructure 
spending productivity is the same in both regions, i.e. ρ =1 and 1 2ψ ψ ψ= = . Comparing 
(26) and  (27) with (32) and (33) it can be shown that: 
 
 1 2
1 2 1
3 2, ,
* **
C D D
ψ ψτ τ τ+ += < = = , 1 23 21 2 1, ,
* **
C D D
ψ ψλ λ λψ ψ= > = =+ +  
 
If the two regions are exactly identical, centralization clearly leads to a lower optimal tax 
rate, and to a higher budget share devoted to infrastructure. This illustrates the fiscal 
externality that is at work in this model. Under decentralization individual governments 
take into account the effect of public policies on the relative price p when choosing 
optimal policies, whereas the federal government takes the population size into account 
when it determines how policies influence the relative price. This effect disappears 
completely when the two countries are of equal size (this can be seen from expression 
(29) for total welfare where the term containing the relative price level falls out when 
ρ =1 ). To clearly see this, suppose 1 2D D Cτ τ τ= =, , * . When ρ =1 and 1 2ψ ψ ψ= =  the 
expression for the relative price (21) becomes: 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1 1,1, 1, 1,
2, 2, 2,
2, 2 2, 2, 2, 2 2,
1
1
11
1 1
t t t t tt t t
t
t t t
t t t t t
A h A hw h
p
w h A h A h
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
τ λ ττ
τ τ λ τ
−
−
−−= =− −
 
 
Recall that the per capita stocks of human capital 1,th  and 2,th  have been accumulated in 
the previous period, so they are not affected by current policies.  
 
1
1,1
1,
1, 1
tt
t
t
p ψ ψ τττ ψ
− −⎛ ⎞∂ = Φ ⎜ ⎟∂ −⎝ ⎠ , where 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1, 1, 1 1,
2, 2 2, 2, 2, 2 2,
1
1
1
t t t
t t t t t
A h A h
A h A h
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
λ
τ λ τ
−
−Φ = −
 
 
But Cτ ψ>* , so 1 tτ ψ>, . Thus, an increase in 1Dτ ,  reduces the relative price p (which 
benefits region 1). It can be shown also that an increase in 2Dτ ,  increases p (which 
benefits region 2). Thus, under full decentralization, 1 2C D Dτ τ τ< =, , . Similarly, starting 
from 1 2D D Cλ λ λ= =, , * , a reduction in 1Dλ ,  decreases the productivity of workers in region 
1 and their disposable income. This results in a decrease in p (which benefits region 1). 
Similarly, a reduction in 2Dλ ,  increases p (which benefits region 2). Thus, 
1 2D D Cλ λ λ= <, ,* * * . 
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IV.3. The partially centralized case  
 
Suppose the tax rate is set at the federal level, but the expenditure decisions are made by 
the single regions. This setup loosely corresponds to the situation in Germany, where the 
single states (Länder) have discretion over the composition of their local budgets but 
have few own sources of tax revenue. As revenue and expenditure choices are completely 
separated in the present model, it is straightforward to see that the optimal choices of tax 
rate and infrastructure budget share are simply given by 
 
 1 2, ,
* * *
P P Cτ τ τ= =  and  , ,* *i P i Dλ λ=    for 1 2,i =  
 
The subscript “P” refers to the partly centralized case. Given our previous results we can 
infer that, compared to the decentralized case, partial centralization will lead to a lower 
optimal tax rate for at least the “high-ψ ” region, if not for both regions. In an analogous 
way we can compute all endogenous variables for this fiscal regime, in particular total 
national welfare (see also appendix A): ( )* * 1, 2,* * *,,P P Pi DC U Uτ λ ρΩ = + ⋅ . 
 
Finally, there is also the other partially centralized case where the tax rates are decided 
upon at the regional level, but the expenditure share is set at the federal level. We neglect 
this case, however, because we cannot think of a real world example where public 
finance is organized in this way. 
 
 
V. Comparison of fiscal regimes 
 
We now compare the different fiscal regimes from a normative point of view by 
analyzing total national welfare in the two-region economy for decentralization, full 
centralization and partial centralization (see also appendix A). For the matter of 
comparing these fiscal regimes, we consider total welfare differences  
 
 ( ) ( ), ,* * * ** *, ,C C D i D i DC Cτ λ τ λΔΩ ≡ Ω −Ω  and ( ) ( ), , ,* * * ** *, ,P P Di D i D i DCτ λ τ λΔΩ ≡ Ω −Ω  (34) 
 
which describe the welfare gains of full (partial) centralization. Some important results 
can be proven analytically. 
 
Proposition 3 
The optimal fiscal regime does not depend on the total factor productivity levels 1 2A A, , 
the productivity of human capital accumulation, θ , and the input elasticity of own time 
spent in education, η . 
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Proof:  
Plugging all endogenous variables into (34) it is possible to show that  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0z z z
iA θ η
∂ ΔΩ ∂ ΔΩ ∂ ΔΩ= = =∂ ∂ ∂  for ,z C P= , 1, 2i =  
for all admissible values of 1 2, , ,ψ ψ ρ δ  and γ .   
 
 
The parameters 1 2, ,A A θ  and η  affect the welfare levels in the two regions. For example, 
the larger is the total factor productivity iA , the higher is welfare in region i under any 
fiscal regime, everything else equal. However, these parameters do not influence which 
fiscal regime is the optimal one. The intuition behind proposition 3 is that the respective 
parameters (i) have no effect on the optimal policy choices under any fiscal regime, and 
(ii) that they enter welfare functions as constant terms due to log utility. This can be seen 
easily by taking logs of equation (19), the steady state level of human capital, which fixes 
all other endogenous variables:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )111 11 1 1 1 1i ii i ii i i i i iii iln h ln B A ln
γψγ ψψ
ψγ ψγ δ δ γ δ δ
ψ
ψ ψ λ τ λ τ
+ −−− −− − − − − − − −
⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠   
 
The first term consists of exogenous parameters only and does not depend on iτ  or iλ , 
hence it will cancel out when differencing welfare expressions for different fiscal 
regimes. The same is not true for the parameters δ  and γ . Although they do not directly 
affect the policy choices of iτ  or iλ , they enter also the second term in and will therefore 
have an impact on the welfare differences CΔΩ  and PΔΩ . 
 
 
V.1. Gains from full centralization  
 
We first study the gains from full centralization of fiscal policy. The crucial parameters 
for the normative analysis of CΔΩ  are 1ψ , 2ψ , and ρ  because they directly influence 
optimal policy choices *iτ  and *iλ . Still the expression for CΔΩ  does not render 
straightforward analytical results for general values of δ  and γ . Hence we assign 
specific numerical values to these parameters, namely 0 1δ = .  and 0 05γ = . . These 
values are in line with estimates used in the literature studying human capital 
accumulation.6 Given the parameter restriction ( )( )1 1 iγ δ ψ< − −  stated above this 
imposes an upper bound of 0.944 for the infrastructure spending productivity iψ  which 
                                                 
6 For example, Rangazas (2000) uses values like 0.1-0.15 for the elasticity of public education and 0.2-0.25 
for the elasticity of parental human capital in the education production function in the context of the US.  
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also seems to be perfectly in line with empirical estimates.7 We present some robustness 
checks in appendix B where we let δ  and γ  vary. It turns out that parameter changes 
have little effects on our qualitative results.  
 
 
Figure 1: Welfare gains from full fiscal centralization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 parameter values: 2 0 25ψ = . , 0 05.γ = , 0 1.δ =  
 
 
We illustrate the gains from centralization in figure 1. We fix 2ψ  at some level and plot 
the function CΔΩ  against 1ψ  for different scenarios of country size ρ .8 Purely for 
expositional purposes we pick 2 0 25ψ = . , and plot only the range of 1ψ  between zero and 
0.5 instead of the full admissible range between zero and 0.944. If 1ψ  coincides with the 
predetermined level 2 0 25ψ = .  both regions are identical in terms of their infrastructure 
spending productivity, otherwise spending is more (less) productive in region 1 than in 
region 2 if 1ψ  is to the right (left) of 0 25. . The thick solid curve represents the case 
where both regions are equally large ( 1ρ = ), the thin solid line illustrates the case where 
                                                 
7 Estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to public capital vary in the empirical literature 
depending on the type of data and the econometric methodology used. While time series studies obtain 
estimates as high as 0.4, panel data studies with fixed effects such as Holz-Eakin (1994) find much lower 
values. For an overview, see Romp and de Haan (2005). 
8 From proposition 3 we know that the choice of θ , η  and iA  is completely irrelevant for our results, so   
we pick 2θ = , 0 5.η =  and 1 2 5A A= = . 
CΔΩ  
1ρ =
1ψ  
0 5.ρ =  
2ρ =  
2ψ  
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region 1 has double the size of region 2 ( 0 5.ρ = ) and the thin broken line is the case with 
2ρ =  where region 1 has half the size. 
 
If spending productivity in region 1 is similar to that in region 2 full centralization yields 
higher aggregate national welfare than decentralization ( 0CΔΩ > ). In fact the gains from 
centralization are highest if the two regions have identical spending productivities. As 
regions get more dissimilar, i.e. if 1ψ  is sufficiently different from 2ψ , decentralization 
yields higher national welfare ( 0CΔΩ < ). Country size ρ  matters only insofar as it 
affects the quantitative size of gains/loss from centralization. However, the parameter 
range of 1ψ  where centralization is preferable over decentralization does not depend on ρ . Graphically this can be seen by the fact that the inverse U-shaped curves cross the 
horizontal axis in the same two points. Lastly it can be shown that the curve CΔΩ  is 
symmetric around 2ψ . That is, decentralization is preferable if regions are dissimilar in 
terms of their infrastructure spending productivity, but for given ρ  results are analogous 
independent of whether 1ψ  is larger or smaller than 2ψ . 
 
The intuition of this result is that centralization has one advantage and one disadvantage 
compared to decentralization in this model. While decentralized governments fully try to 
manipulate the relative price, the centralized government also takes into account the 
effects of its policies on the relative price. In the case of centralization this relative price 
effect depends upon relative population sizes and vanishes completely when the two 
regions are of equal size. However, the disadvantage of centralization is that the federal 
government imposes an identical policy (“one size fits all”) on both regions, although 
regions may be heterogeneous in terms of their infrastructure spending productivity. If 
both regions happen to have the same spending productivity, i.e. if 1 2ψ ψ= , the costs of 
centralization are immaterial in the sense that both regions would choose identical 
policies also under decentralization, yet not the “right” policy because the fiscal 
externality is not internalized under decentralization. Hence centralization must lead to 
higher aggregate welfare in this case. The more dissimilar the regions are in terms of their 
iψ ’s, the more costly becomes the “one size fits all” policy associated with 
centralization. Hence, beyond a certain degree of dissimilarity decentralization is 
preferable over a centralized fiscal regime. For a given 2ψ  the gains from centralization 
increase quantitatively with the size of region 2.  
 
 
V.2. Gains from partial centralization  
 
The analysis of the gains from partial centralization is analogous. In figure 2 we plot 
PΔΩ  against 1ψ  for different scenarios of country size ρ , given the same parameter 
constellation as in figure 1. We again find that centralization, in this case only of the tax 
revenue decision, yields higher aggregate welfare than decentralization ( 0PΔΩ > ) if 
regions tend to be similar in terms of their iψ s, and lower welfare ( 0PΔΩ < ) if they are 
sufficiently different.  
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Figure 2: Welfare gains from partial fiscal centralization 
 
 
However, in contrast to CΔΩ  from figure 1, the curve PΔΩ  is not symmetric around 2ψ . 
To understand intuitively why this is so, consider first the case of equally sized regions 
( 1ρ = ). For the parameter constellation 2 0 25ψ = .  and [ ]1 0 0 5, .ψ ∈  one can compute:  
 
 
1
* 3
7 4C
τ ψ= − , 
( )1
,1
* 1
2D
ψτ += , ,2* 0.625Dτ =  1* 1 23C
ψλ += , 1,1
1
* 2
1D
ψλ ψ= + , ,2
* 0.4Dλ =   
 
It is easy to check that a move from decentralization to the partially centralized regime 
would lead to lower tax rates in both regions. The downward adjustment in the size of the 
public budget is stronger in the “high-ψ ” than in the “low-ψ ” region. This can also be 
seen in figure 3 (panel A) where we graphically illustrate the optimal tax rates under the 
centralized and the de-centralized regime. If 1 0.25ψ < , the difference between *Cτ  and 
*
,2Dτ  is larger than between *Cτ  and * ,1Dτ , hence the size of the public budget would change 
by less in region 1 (vice versa if 1 0.25ψ > ).  
 
Under partial centralization every region can still make its own decision on the 
composition of its budget, i.e. the regions maintain one policy tool that they can use 
strategically in order to shift the terms of trade in their respective favour. With 1 0.25ψ <  
region 1 is the “low-ψ ” region, and finds it optimal to spend a lower budget share on 
infrastructure than the “high-ψ ” region 2. The optimal budget share ,1*Dλ  is further away 
than ,2
*
Dλ  from the budget share *Cλ  that would result if also the expenditure decision 
were centralized (see panel B). This explains why there is a conflict of interest between 
regions when comparing decentralization and partial centralization. This is illustrated in 
2ψ  
PΔΩ  
1ρ =
1ψ  
0 5.ρ =  
2ρ =  
parameter values: 2 0 25ψ = . , 0 05γ = . , 0 1δ = .  
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panel C, where we depict the welfare difference between regimes for both regions, 
, ,
* *
i P i DU U−  for i=1,2. If 1ψ  is sufficiently small region 2 prefers full decentralization, 
because partial centralization implies a loss of fiscal autonomy in the dimension where 
region 2 is relatively stronger affected (the adjustment of tax rates). In contrast, region 1 
prefers a centralization of the tax rate setting. It is relatively less affected by the implied 
change in the budget size, but the region maintains fiscal autonomy with respect to the 
budget composition which allows it to make a quite “idiosyncratic” strategic decision, 
namely to spend only a small share on infrastructure.  
 
 
Figure 3: Tax rate, budget composition and welfare under different fiscal regimes 
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As it turns out, this preference of region 1 for the partially centralized regime is stronger 
than the preference of region 2 for the decentralized regime, because the difference in the 
optimal budget shares for different regimes is relatively stronger than the difference 
between optimal tax rates for small values of 1ψ  (see panels A, B). As regions have equal 
weights in the aggregate welfare when 1ρ = , it follows that 0PΔΩ >  for 10 0 25.ψ< < . 
For increasing levels of 1ψ  the interest of the “low-ψ ” region to maintain autonomy over 
its expenditure decision becomes less important compared to the effect of falling budget 
sizes. This can be seen by noting that 1D Cτ τ−,* *  is increasing in 1ψ  while 1C Dλ λ−* * ,  is 
C: Partial centralization gains (Ui,P – Ui,D)
A: tax rates 
D: Full centralization gains (Ui,C – Ui,D) 
B: budget composition 
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decreasing in 1ψ  (panels A, B). The preference of the “high-ψ ” region for the 
decentralized regime will dominate beyond a certain level of 1ψ  because the gains from 
lower taxation increase while there is little loss from changing the share spent on 
infrastructure. Hence, the asymmetry of the curve PΔΩ  in figure 2 follows.  
 
When ρ =2, i.e. the population in region 2 is twice as large as in region 1, the 
decentralized regime is preferred over the partially centralized one when 1ψ  approaches 
zero, and vice versa when 1ψ  approaches its maximum value (see figure 2). This is 
because the weight of region 2 in the aggregate welfare is now higher. A similar 
argument applies when ρ =0.5. Finally, note that a comparable regional conflict of 
interest does not arise when comparing decentralization and full centralization, where 
local governments lose the autonomy over both fiscal decisions. As can be seen in panel 
D of figure 3, welfare in the single regions is almost identically affected by a move from 
decentralization to full centralization. Either both regions are better off with 
decentralization, or they are both better off with full centralization. This illustrates why 
the curve CΔΩ  is symmetric around 2 0 25ψ = .  in figure 1. 
 
A comparison of figures 1 and 2 reveals the following interesting outcome: There are 
parameter constellations where the move to full centralization generates a welfare gain, 
but a move to partial centralization generates a welfare loss. This is the case when 1ρ =  
and when 1ψ  is just below 4. This result is reminiscent of analogous results from the tax 
competition literature where restrictions on policy variables chosen by the regional 
governments might actually turn out to be detrimental since they could induce local 
governments to compete more vigorously along those dimensions which remain fully 
under their control (see, for example, Keen 2001 and Janeba and Smart, 2003). 
 
 
V.3. Optimal fiscal regime  
 
Finally we can address the question which of the three fiscal regimes is optimal for the 
economy. In figure 4 we jointly plot the gains from full and partial centralization, and we 
limit ourselves to the case of equal regional size ( 1ρ = ). The figure suggests that full 
centralization is optimal if regions have very similar infrastructure spending 
productivities, partial centralization is optimal if the regions are mildly dissimilar, and 
decentralization is optimal if they are sufficiently strongly different in their iψ ’s. Based 
on the previous discussion, it is worthwhile to notice the asymmetry in the optimal 
regime as the regions become more dissimilar. When 1ψ  approaches zero, implying 
different regional and low average infrastructure productivity, the partial centralization 
prevails as the optimal regime. When 1ψ  increases beyond the given 2ψ  this also implies 
more different regions but high average infrastructure productivity in the nation as a 
whole. Starting from 1 2ψ ψ=  where full centralization is optimal, an increase in 1ψ  first 
renders partial centralization the optimal regime. After a certain level of dissimilarity 
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when 1ψ  increases further, full decentralization becomes the optimal arrangement. This 
prevails until 1ψ  reaches its maximum value ).1/(1 δγ −−   
 
 
Figure 4: Optimal fiscal regime 
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0.05
0.1
0.15
Full
Partial
 
parameter values: 2 0 25ψ = . , 0 05.γ = , 0 1.δ = , 1ρ =  
 
 
The above result captures the underlying tension in this model. Centralization is best 
when externalities can be internalized and when “one size fits all.” This is only true when 
the two infrastructure productivities and population sizes are similar. An increase in the 
difference between the two regions increases the cost of internalization of externalities; 
for sufficiently large differences the cost of trying to make one size fit all becomes too 
large. Notice that the welfare rankings of the three regimes are sensitive to relative 
population sizes. For example, as is clear from Figure 2, for large values of ρ  
decentralization is dominated by partial centralization over a wide range of values of 1ψ  
larger than 2ψ . 
 
 
V.4. Implications for steady state output level  
 
Apart from the normative question which fiscal regime maximizes aggregate national 
welfare one can also analyze the implications of fiscal (de)centralization for aggregate 
(gross) national income in the steady state. For time constant policy parameters, national 
output can be derived from (19) as ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2w h w hτ λ ρ τ λϒ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅, , . It is given by 
1ψ
2ψ
PCΔΩ ΔΩ,  
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  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 21 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 21 2 1 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
, ,
, , ,
A h A h
ψ ψλ τ τ λ λ τ τ λτ τ λ λ ρλ τ λ τ
− −⋅ ⋅ϒ = + ⋅  (35) 
 
Plugging the values iτ  and iλ  from (26), (27), (32) and (33) into (35) yields expressions 
for national steady state output in the three different fiscal regimes, given that the 
respective policies are chosen optimally. That is, we do not consider new policy rules for 
revenue and expenditure decisions that maximize (local or national) output, but we 
evaluate the consequences of welfare maximizing policies for output in the different 
regimes. Similarly as before we can now derive ( ) ( )C C C C D D i D iτ λ τ λΔϒ = ϒ − ϒ , ,* * * ** *, ,  and ( ) ( )P P C D i D D i D iτ λ τ λΔϒ = ϒ − ϒ, , ,* * * ** *, , , which represent the output gains from full and 
partial fiscal centralization, respectively. For the derivation of these expressions, also 
refer to appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 5: Fiscal centralization and output 
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In figure 5 we plot CΔϒ  and PΔϒ  for the same parameter constellation as in figure 4. It 
turns out that in this constellation any type of fiscal centralization is always associated 
with a lower steady state output level. This finding is consistent with the “Oates 
conjecture” that fiscal decentralization leads to faster capital accumulation, and it is also 
qualitatively in line with the recent findings by Brueckner (2006) although our model 
relies on entirely different mechanisms. Note, however, that even though centralization is 
parameter values: 2 0 25ψ = . , 0 05γ = . , 0 1δ = . , 1ρ =  
1ψ  
PCΔϒ Δϒ,  
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associated with lower gross domestic product in the present constellation, it is 
nevertheless the optimal, welfare maximizing fiscal regime if the regional infrastructure 
spending productivities are sufficiently similar.  
 
The reason for this discrepancy can be described intuitively for the case of identical 
regions (for formal derivations of the argument, refer to appendix C). If 1ψ  and 2ψ  are 
the same, fiscal centralization will lead to a lower tax rate and to a higher budget share 
devoted to infrastructure in both regions, see our propositions 1 and 2. This policy change 
implies a lower level of human capital accumulation ih
*  and lower school quality iE
*  
under centralization than under decentralization, because a smaller share of a smaller 
budget goes to education funding. Wages will also decline, despite the larger 
infrastructure investments, hence fiscal centralization causes a loss of gross national 
income. The lower school quality has an additional negative impact on welfare due to the 
warm glow altruism entailed in the utility function. However, the lower tax rate under 
fiscal centralization implies a higher net income that is available for consumption. This 
effect actually compensates the various negative impacts, and fiscal centralization 
increase aggregate national welfare when 1ψ = 2ψ  and 1ρ =  although it decreases the 
gross domestic product.9 The output under partial decentralization is lower compared to 
the full centralization case since the size (τ ) and the structure (λ ) of the regions’ 
budgets are jointly chosen optimally in the centralized regime while in the semi-
centralized case the composition of the budget is suboptimal, given the budget size has 
already been chosen at the central level.  
 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
We study the implications of the government policies on education and infrastructure in a 
two-region economy under three different regimes (centralized, de-centralized or mixed). 
Our main concern is to characterize the optimal tax rate and budget shares in each 
scenario and analyze which fiscal regime maximizes aggregate national welfare. 
 
The assumption of regional differences in productivity of government infrastructure is 
essential for our results. We find that full fiscal decentralization is welfare maximizing if 
the regional differences in the productivity of public capital are sufficiently large. On the 
contrary, fiscal centralization is optimal in countries where infrastructure productivity is 
similar across regions. The optimal governmental allocation between infrastructure and 
public education is shown to depend upon the degree of centralization. While welfare 
gains from full centralization are symmetric in infrastructure productivity differences, 
partial centralization generates asymmetric welfare gains. We also find that fiscal 
                                                 
9 The result that fiscal centralization is associated with an output loss is not an entirely general conclusion. 
Numerical simulations suggest that CΔϒ >0 may occur, in particular, if 1A  > 2A  and 1ψ < 2ψ  (or 1A  < 
2A  and 1ψ > 2ψ ). 
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decentralization may cause faster capital accumulation and higher steady state output, 
consistent with the “Oates-conjecture”, but it may still be inferior to centralization in 
terms of aggregate welfare.  
 
The framework used in this paper relies on a few simplifying assumptions. We assumed 
that both regions are characterized by the same level of total factor productivity (TFP). In 
most interesting cases there are large differences in incomes and TFP across regions. The 
utility functions treat both consumption goods symmetrically. If one of the regions 
specializes in agricultural products and the other region specializes in manufacturing or 
services, Engel curves are not straight lines and income elasticities for agricultural 
products are close to zero. This can be modeled with semi-linear utility functions. 
Combining semi-linear utility functions with differences in TFP may prove fruitful. We 
have also abstracted completely from migration. Allowing for differences in TFP which 
can generate realistic income differences will give rise to substantial regional migration 
flows. Studying these extensions is left for future work.  
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Appendix A: Welfare under different fiscal regimes 
 
A.1 Decentralization 
 
Substituting (26)-(28) into (16), (17) and (21) we can express the following endogenous 
variables in terms of the model parameters only 
 
( ), , 1* * i ii D i i i i Dw A A h ψψψ −= ,  ( ), , , , 11* * * * ii D i i D i D i i i DiiY w h A h ψρ ψρψ −= ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ,  
 
( ) ( ), , , , , 11* * * * *1 12 ii D i D i D i D i i i i DiiE Y A h ψλ τ ρ ψψψ −= − ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅−   
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1
1, 1,
1
2, 2,
* *
*
* *
1
1
D
D D
D D
A h A h
p
A h A h
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
ρ ψ ψ
−
−
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
 with 1 1ρ =  and 2ρ ρ=  
 
 
Substituting this into (22) and (23) we obtain regional welfare levels: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
11
1
22
2
11
1 1 1, 1 1, 1 1 1,
1
2 2
2 2 2, 2 2 2
2
(1 )
1,
1
1
1
2, 2,
1
1
* * * *
* * *
1 11 2
32 64 2
1 1
2
D D D
D
D
D D
B A A h A hU Ln Ln h
Ln B A h A h A h
γ
δ
ψ
ψ
ψψ
ψ
ψδ γψ ψ ψψ
ψ
η
ρ ψ ψψ ψψ
−
−
−
−− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥−⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟= + ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟+ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
11
1
22
2
11
1 1 1, 1 1, 1 1 1,
1
2 2
2 2 2, 2 2 2
2
(1 )
2,
1
1
1
2, 2,
1
1
* * * *
* * *
1 11
32 64 2
1 1
2
2
D D D
D
D
D D
B A A h A hU Ln Ln h
Ln B A h A h A h
γ
δ
ψ
ψ
ψψ
ψ
ψδ γψ ψ ψρ ψ
ψ
η
ψ ψψ ψψ
−
−
−
−− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥−⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟= + ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟+ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
Aggregate national welfare is then given by 1, 2,
* * *
D D DU UρΩ = + ⋅ . The closed form 
solution for national output under decentralization follows as 1 2, ,
* * *
D D DY Yρϒ = + ⋅ . 
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A.2 Full centralization 
 
With policy parameters as in (32) and (33) steady state human capital (19) becomes: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
1 2 1
1 2 1 2
1
,
1
1
1 1
* 2 1 2 3 (1 )
3 2 3 2i C
i
i i
ii i
i
A A
B Ah γ
ψ
ψ
γ ψ
γ δ ψ δψ ρ ψ ρ ψ ρ
ψ ψ ρ ψ ψσ
−
−
− − − −+ + + − +
− − + − −
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟′⋅ = ⋅⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
 
Using this expression in (16), (17) and (21) we derive the endogenous variables 
 
  ( ), , 1* *i C i i i C i iw A A h ψψσ −= ⋅ ⋅ ,  ( ) ( ), , 111* *i C i i i i Ci iiY A A hψ ψψρ σ −−= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅   
  
 ( )( ) ( ), , 111* *i C i i i i Ci iiE A A hψ ψψρ σ σ −−′= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅   
 
 ( ) ( )1 21 21 11 1, 1 1, 2 2, 2 2,* * * * *C C C C Cp A h A h A h A hψ ψψ ψσ ρ σ− −⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  
 
where 
( )( ) ( )
( )
1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 3 1 3 1 2
3 2 3 2
ψ ψ ρ ψ ψ ρσ ψ ψ ρ ψ ψ
− + − + +≡ − − + − − ,   
( )( )( )
( )1 21 2 1 2
1 1 1
3 2 3 2
ρ ψ ψσ ψ ψ ρ ψ ψ
+ − −′ ≡ − − + − −  
 
 
Using this, we can determine regional welfare levels under full fiscal centralization: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 22 2, 2, 11* *1, 11 11* * *1, 1,1 21 2 C CC C CU Ln Ln Ln B A h EB A h E δ γ ψδ γ ψ ση σ ρσσσ σ −−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= + ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
′ ′
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 11 1, 1, 11* *2, 2 11* * *2, 2,1 21 2 C CC C CU Ln Ln Ln B A h EB A h E δ γ ψδ γ ψ ση σ σσσ ρσ −−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
′ ′
 
And aggregate steady state welfare and output are then, respectively, given by  
 
 1, 2,
* * *
C C CU UρΩ = + ⋅  and 1 2, ,* * *C C CY Yρϒ = + ⋅
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A.3 Partial centralization 
 
Finally, with policy parameters (27) and (33) endogenous variables are: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11, 1 1
1
* 1 (2) i iii P i i
i
i
i
Bh A
γ
ψ ψ
γ δ δψ
ψ
ψ σψ
−
− − − −
−
⋅
⎡ ⎤−⎛ ⎞′′⋅ = ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
 ( ), ,
1* *2
1
i i
i P i i P
i
i
iAw A h
ψ
ψψ σψ
−⎛ ⎞′′= ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
,  ( ) ( ), , 111* *i P i i i i i Pi iiY A A hψ ψψρ σ −−′′= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅   
  
( ), , 11* *1 (2)ii P i i i i P
i
i iE A hψ ψψρ σψ
−⎛ ⎞− ′′= ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 , ( )( ) ( )( )
1
1
2
2
1 1, 1 1 1,
2 2, 2 2 2,
1 2
1 2
1
1
1 1
* *
*
* *
2
P P
P
P P
A h A h
p
A h A h
ψ
ψ
ψ
ψ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ σ
σ
−
−
−
− −
⎡ ⎤′′⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥′′⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
where ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
1 2 2 1
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 1 2
1 3 2 3 2
i
i
i
ψ ψ ρ ψ ψψσ ψ ψ ψ ρ ψ ψ
+ − + + −′′≡ ⋅+ − − + − −   (for i = 1,2).   
 
This gives rise to the following regional welfare levels: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 21 2 2 2, 2, 11* *1, 11 11* * *1, 1,1 21 2 P PP P PU Ln Ln Ln B A h EB A h E δ γ ψδ γ ψ ση σ ρσσσ σ −−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ′′⎢ ⎥= + ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
′ ′′′
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 12 1 1 1, 1, 11* *2, 2 11* * *2, 2,1 21 2 P PP P PU Ln Ln Ln B A h EB A h E δ γ ψδ γ ψ ση σ σσσ ρσ −−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ′′⎢ ⎥= + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
′ ′′′
 
 
which can then be used in an analogous way to compute aggregate welfare 
1, 2,
* * *
P P PU UρΩ = + ⋅  and national output 1 2, ,* * *P P PY Yρϒ = + ⋅ . 
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Appendix B: Sensitivity analysis of parameter changes in γ and δ 
 
In this appendix we study the robustness of our results with respect to parameter changes 
in γ  and δ . For brevity we will only consider the gains from centralization ( CΔΩ ). 
Furthermore, since country size plays no critical role we only look at the case with 1ρ =  
 
In figure 6a we plot CΔΩ  for three different scenarios of the productivity of public 
education spending γ , for given values of δ  and 2ψ . In all scenarios we obtain the same 
reverse U-shaped curve as in fig.1, i.e. the gains from centralization mainly accrue when 
regions are similar in terms of their infrastructure spending productivities iψ . However, 
if γ  exceeds a certain level the centralization gains are never positive, hence 
decentralization always yields a higher aggregate welfare level than centralization. In 
Figure 6b we perform a similar exercise for the parameter δ  that measures the impact of 
parental human capital in the offspring’s learning technology. The reverse U-shape 
remains for the curve CΔΩ , but beyond a certain level of δ  centralization can never 
outperform decentralization. It can be checked that all contemplated scenarios satisfy the 
parameter restriction ( )( )11 1γ δ ψ< − −  in the relevant range of 1ψ .  
 
 
Figure 6a: Changing γ     Figure 6b: Changing δ  
 
(γ =0.01, γ =0.15, γ =0.3), given δ =0.1 (δ=0.01, δ=0.15, δ=0.5), given γ=0.05 
 
 
In sum, these simulations suggest that there are cases where centralization is never better 
than decentralization, even if the regions have identical iψ ’s. This is more likely to 
happen if the learning technology is rather productive, meaning that the parameters δ  
and γ  are large. Intuitively this is due to the fact that under a centralized fiscal regime the 
government tends to devote a larger budget share to infrastructure and a smaller share to 
education funding (see proposition 2). This “neglect” of schooling has particularly large 
effects if the elasticity of the single components of the learning technology is large.  
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Appendix C: Output versus welfare 
 
In the case with two identical regions ( 1ψ = 2ψ ψ= , 1A = 2A A= , 1ρ = ), the difference in 
human capital formation between decentralization and full centralization reads as 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 113 2 3 2 01, ,
)* * *C i C i Dh h h hB A A
γ ψ
γ γ δ ψ δγ γ γ γψ ψψ ψ
−
− − − −− − − −−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Δ ≡ − = − ⋅ = − ⋅ <⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
− %
 
for i=1,2, i.e. centralization leads to less human capital formation in both regions. The 
respective difference in wages, school quality, gross and net national output is given by 
 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )13 2 0, ,* * *C i C i Dw w w A A h ψ ψγ γ ψ −− −Δ ≡ − = − ⋅ <%  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 13 1 2 1 03 2, ,* * *C i C i Dq q q A h ψ
γ γψ ψ ψψ ψ
−− −⎛ ⎞− −Δ ≡ − = − ⋅ <⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
%  
 
 ( )( )( ) ( )1 12 3 2 0* * *C C D A h ψγ γψ ψ −− −Δϒ = ϒ − ϒ = − ⋅ <%  
 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )1 1431 1 2 3 2 1 0* * * *( ) ( ) ( ) *C C C D DN A h ψγ γτ τ ψ ψ ψ ψ −− −Δ ϒ = − ϒ − − ϒ = ⋅ − − ⋅ >% . 
 
That is, fiscal centralization leads to lower wages, school quality and gross output. 
However, net income and thus consumption is higher under centralization. This effect 
dominates so welfare is higher under centralization with two identical regions. 
 
 
 
